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Abstract 
Corporate greenwash has accelerated in recent years, bringing in its wake growing skepticism about 
corporate green claims.   Although a theory of the drivers and deterrents of greenwash has begun to 
emerge, it is static in nature and does not incorporate the full range of ways in which firms can 
misrepresent their environmental performance.  Our contribution is three-fold.  First, we extend the theory 
of organizational information disclosure to incorporate the possibility of undue modesty about a firm’s 
environmental, social and governance practices.  Second, we hypothesize about the drivers of 
exaggeration and undue modesty based on which of a firm’s stakeholders are salient at a given point in 
time; to do so we place the firm within a dynamic context that has largely been missing in the prior 
literature. Third, we test our hypotheses using a dataset that allows us to directly compare corporate green 
claims against actual performance.  Results reveal that corporate output growth, deregulation, and low 
profits under deregulation significantly affect the choice between greenwash and brownwash. The effects 
of growth and profits are mitigated by external scrutiny. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Pressure for companies to behave responsibly towards the environment has grown dramatically in recent 
years.   Sales of “green” products are mushrooming, reaching more than $40 billion in 2011 (Advertising 
Age, 2012), and “sustainable and responsible investments” reached over $3 trillion in 2012 (United States 
SIF, 2013).   As social expectations for corporate responsibility have risen, many scholars and consultants 
have argued that it “pays to be green” (Porter and van der Linde, 1995; Hart and Ahuja, 1996; King and 
Lenox, 2001).   
 The notion that it “pays to be green” actually runs counter to a large literature finding that 
environmental regulations are costly for firms (for a thorough and influential review, see Palmer, Oates 
and Portney, 1995).  Indeed, the entire environmental regulatory paradigm is built around the idea that 
firms must be forced to make environmental improvements, because they will find it costly and 
unprofitable, and thus not do so on their own.
1
  The EPA’s regulation of greenhouse gases under the 
Clean Air Act provides a valuable reminder that firms have fought climate regulation vigorously because 
they believe it will increase their costs.
2
  Indeed, there is a large body of research finding that carbon 
regulation will impose costs on firms (Stern, 2007; Nordhaus, 2007; Aldy and Stavins, 2011). Moreover, 
recent financial event studies confirm that under some circumstances it may “pay be to be brown.”  
Several recent papers find that firms may experience negative abnormal returns when it is disclosed that 
they took environmentally friendly actions or won green awards (Jacobs et al., 2010; Fisher-Vanden and 
Thorburn, 2011; Lyon et al., 2013).  These papers do not advance and test specific mechanisms linking 
environmental performance and negative investor responses.  However, they suggest that green firms 
incur unduly high costs, for which investors punish them. This inference is consistent with the large 
earlier literature that found it is costly for firms to be green.  Apparently, Milton Friedman’s (1970) 
                                                 
1
 If environmental regulations were costless (or even carried a negative cost), it would be unnecessary to justify and 
measure the presumed social benefits of environmental programs and to make the case for incentive-based policy 
instruments that emphasize the incentives that these approaches provide for firms to innovate in abatement 
technology (Palmer et al., 1995). 
2
 “Administration Presses Ahead With Limits on Emissions From Power Plants,” The New York Times, 09/19/2013. 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2546497 
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dictum that the social responsibility of business is to maximize profits still has many adherents, who may 
sell shares of a firm seemingly engaged in what Friedman called “hypocritical window dressing.”   
If being green is not always a “win/win” proposition, and firms face a tension between the 
demands of shareholders and pressures from secondary stakeholders, then they may have incentives to  
exaggerate their environmental accomplishments through their information disclosure strategies, i.e., to 
greenwash (Bansal and Clelland, 2004; Ramus and Montiel, 2005; Lyon and Maxwell, 2011; Kim and 
Lyon, 2011; Delmas and Burbano, 2011; Lyon and Montgomery, 2013; Marquis and Toffel, 2013; 
Bowen, 2014).  Indeed, market research suggests that a very high percentage of corporate green claims 
are misleading (Terrachoice, 2010), and revered advertising agency Ogilvy and Mather says that 
greenwashing has reached “epidemic proportions” (Hsu, 2011).  The emerging literature on greenwash 
focuses on corporate decisions to (1) exaggerate favorable environmental performance, in order to 
improve the opinion of one or more stakeholders, rather than to (2) fully disclose both negative and 
positive aspects of environmental performance or to (3) simply remain silent (Lyon and Maxwell, 2011; 
Delmas and Burbano, 2011).   
In this paper, we extend the theory of greenwash to include a fourth option: firms may choose to 
“brownwash” by issuing communications that understate their environmental achievements. Ullmann 
(1985) suggests that in view of the costs associated with social responsibility programs, firms may 
systematically underreport their activities in this area (Ullmann, 1985), but he does not conduct empirical 
tests, and the idea has not been explored in the subsequent literature.  In light of the recent empirical 
research documenting that green credentials can harm share prices (Jacobs et al., 2010; Fisher-Vanden 
and Thorburn, 2011; Lyon et al., 2013), it is thus important to expand the discussion to incorporate this 
possibility.  Indeed, a recent article in Forbes magazine discusses why companies continue to struggle to 
implement sustainable approaches to doing business and mentions the possibilities of both greenwash and 
brownwash:
3
  
                                                 
3
 “The Pain of Sustainability,” Forbes, 01/18/2012. 
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“Investors, consumers, academics, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), reporters, and 
employees all have their own perspectives on what companies should and should not be doing. A 
company can be returning a profit to shareholders, only to find protesters at its door or lawsuits 
filed…Companies struggle to inform employees, shareholders and stakeholders about how they 
are managing material social and environmental issues…Some companies overstate their impact. 
Other companies, out of fear of being attacked, understate their accomplishments or wind up not 
communicating at all.” 
 
Although the term “brownwash” has an environmental flavor, it should be apparent that our 
analysis applies to social and governance disclosures more broadly (as the quote above suggests), as well 
as environmental ones.  Firms, especially if they are under financial pressure, might understate their 
charitable contributions, their expenditures on employee benefits, or costly community development 
efforts.   Similarly, firms might understate governance changes such as requiring the board to include 
union members or reflect racial or gender diversity.   
Our analysis focuses on information disclosure decisions, but it is also relevant for the literature 
on the “decoupling” of organizations’ formal structures and policies from actual implementation (Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977; Pfeffer, 1981; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Westphal and Zajac, 1998).  Much of this 
literature studies situations where there is a lack of alignment between organizational policies and 
practices.  For example, when there is a gap between the time of the commitment and the time 
implementation takes place (which might never happen), the organization is said to decouple its practice 
from its policy.  This leads to a series of possibilities that parallel the first three disclosure options that we 
earlier identified in the greenwash literature.  First, organizations may appear to be exaggerating their 
performance during the period before implementation, which parallels greenwashing.  Second, over time 
firms may tightly couple their rhetoric and their actions (Fiss and Zajac, 2006; Tilcsik, 2010; Hallett 2010; 
Sandholtz, 2012; Bromley and Powell, 2012), which parallels full disclosure.
4
  Third, it is also possible 
for an organization not to announce a commitment at all, but rather remain silent about a practice it has 
adopted (Bromley and Powell, 2012). For example, the adoption of high-powered financial incentives for 
                                                 
4
 Some papers use the term “recoupling” to describe a situation where coupling is finally accomplished after a 
period of time, but as Tilcsik (2010) points out, this mistakenly implies there was an original coupling, followed by 
decoupling, so we avoid use of the term. 
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executives may be popular in the board room and among investors, but not among labor unions or the 
general public; firms may thus have incentives not to highlight such adoption publicly (Snellman, 2012).     
To the best of our knowledge, the fourth option, undue modesty, has not been explored in either 
the disclosure or the decoupling literatures.  Thus, our analysis offers a new window on the relationship 
between rhetoric and reality in firm behavior.  First, we show that firms have a broader range of options 
for communicating their social and environmental accomplishments than previously recognized---which, 
importantly, includes understating them.  Second, we emphasize that stakeholders’ preferences may 
change over time, and that they interact with changing firm characteristics (such as output growth and 
profitability), to determine a firm’s mix of rhetoric and real action.     
In order to better understand when firms greenwash and when they brownwash, we offer a theory 
that explicitly includes investor pressures, and that accounts for the dynamics of output growth and 
decline and their associated effects on the changing salience of different stakeholder groups over time 
(Mitchell et al., 1997).  We hypothesize that stakeholders in the regulatory arena are more salient when 
the firm is growing and expects to face more frequent and more demanding interactions with them. In 
contrast, shareholders are the more salient stakeholder group when economic deregulation occurs and 
when profits are low.
5
  Thus, firms highlight their favorable environmental performance when they are 
growing in order to build a green reputation that will improve stakeholder interactions, and downplay 
their environmental commitments when investor pressure intensifies and profits are low. Empirically, we 
test these ideas using absolute growth and profits variables for each firm, and conduct robustness checks 
using various relative measures (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999; King and Lenox, 2000; Bizjak, Lemmon, 
Naveen, 2008; Albuquerque, 2009).  
Of course, greenwash is not without risk; if it is detected by external stakeholders, it may throw 
an organization’s activities open to suspicion and reduce its ability to obtain resources, legitimacy, or 
social support (Oliver, 1991; Lyon and Maxwell, 2011).  On the other hand, brownwash makes the firm 
                                                 
5
 Deregulation lifts the government guarantee of a fair rate of return on capital investment, and thus requires firms to 
deal more directly with their investors. We provide more details in the next section. 
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look less environmentally friendly than it really is, and may expose it to criticism from the media or from 
environmentalists.  Thus, regardless of whether the firm is expanding or subject to greater shareholder 
pressure, we expect the firm to hew more closely to the truth when it experiences greater scrutiny from 
external stakeholders such as regulators or environmental activists.   
Often, it is difficult or impossible to measure precisely the extent to which firms engage in 
greenwash. We overcome this challenge by focusing on US electric utilities, for which we can construct 
greenhouse gas emissions estimates. We then compare reductions in firms’ emissions over time to the 
reductions they reported to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)’s Voluntary Reporting of Greenhouse 
Gases Program.  Kim and Lyon (2011) showed that in the aggregate, participants in this program 
increased emissions over time but reported reductions, while non-participants actually reduced emissions.  
This paper explores the behavior of program participants in detail.  A striking empirical observation 
emerges: while many participants overstate their emissions reductions performance, many others 
understate it.  Our theory explains why this occurs and identifies the conditions under which undue 
modesty is to be expected. 
 
A DYNAMIC THEORY OF GREENWASH AND BROWNWASH  
As pressure for corporate environmentalism has grown, greenwashing has grown along with it, and a 
body of literature on greenwashing has begun to emerge (Ramus and Montiel, 2005; Lyon and Maxwell, 
2011; Kim and Lyon, 2011; Delmas and Burbano, 2011; Lyon and Montgomery, 2013; Marquis and 
Toffel, 2013; Bowen, 2014).   This work can be seen as part of the larger literature on misleading 
corporate behavior.  In organizational theory, this includes a large body of work on decoupling and 
symbolic management (Meyer and Rowan, 1977 ; Pfeffer, 1981; Westphal and Zajac, 1994, 2013).  In 
economics, there are large literatures on signaling (Spence, 1977), partial disclosure (Milgrom, 1981), and 
costly state falsification (Lacker and Weinberg, 1989).  In accounting and finance, there is a substantial 
body of work on selective disclosure (Verecchia 1983; Shin, 2003).   
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The literature suggests greenwash is attractive when it can positively influence the opinions of 
consumers and investors regarding a firm or its products, but is deterred by scrutiny from external 
stakeholders such as environmental activists who can detect and punish greenwash (Lyon and Maxwell, 
2011; Lyon and Montgomery, 2013) and by regulatory pressures (Delmas and Burbano 2011).  In 
addition, firm characteristics (such as size, profitability, incentive structure, and organizational inertia) 
and individual characteristics of managers (such as optimistic bias and narrow decision framing) may 
influence greenwashing behaviors (Delmas and Burbano 2011). 
However, the literature to date has ignored the possibility that greenwash may not necessarily 
influence the opinions of shareholders in a positive way.  This is somewhat surprising given that 
Friedman (1970) long ago pointed out that managers might divert resources away from shareholder 
wealth maximization in order to indulge their own preferences for socially-responsible actions.  Thus, 
especially during difficult economic times, managers might prefer to divert attention from costly social 
and environmental initiatives.  We expand the theory of greenwash by including brownwash in the 
portfolio of strategies that organizations may adopt in response to stakeholder pressure. In order to clarify 
when each response is observed, we also expand the existing literature’s static depiction of the drivers of 
greenwash and present a theory that emphasizes the dynamic path of firm production and profitability, 
and their impact on the salience of particular stakeholder groups. 
First, we theorize that a firm’s output growth is an important and under-appreciated factor that 
affects the incentives of stakeholders in the regulatory arena to monitor corporate behavior, and hence 
affects greenwashing.
6
  Growth has been treated as a primary challenge for firms as they evolve (Penrose, 
1959; Mishina, Pollock, and Porac, 2004; Chen, Williams, and Agarwal, 2012). Among the impediments 
to growth identified in the literature is a changing technological regime (Tushman and Anderson, 1986; 
Dowell and Swaminathan, 2006). We posit that with increasing expectations and requests for corporate 
social responsibility, growing firms are especially subject to stakeholder pressures to use the most 
advanced socially responsible technologies in their productions and operations, and that they respond in 
                                                 
6
 Other stakeholders such as customers may also be relevant. We address this subject in the discussion section.  
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part by decoupling.  That is, growing firms experience a particularly strong tension between external 
pressures for social conformity and internal needs for operational efficiency, and this in turn increases 
their incentives to greenwash.  Earlier work argued that firms gain more from greening themselves 
substantively when industry growth is higher, because investment in pollution prevention, organizational 
capabilities, reputation and political acumen all have higher payoffs in fast-growing industries (Russo and 
Fouts 1997).  We shift the focus from industry growth to the growth of the individual firm, and from 
substantive greening to greenwash.   
We hypothesize that growing firms are more likely to engage in greenwash because of their 
exposure to pressures arising from the need to maintain their “license to operate” as they expand.  These 
include, for example, pressures from local zoning regulations and environmental regulations, both of 
which provide opportunities for a variety of stakeholders to provide input into the social licensing process 
(Ingram et al. 2010). Enhanced support from external stakeholders can reduce opportunistic hold-up by 
stakeholders with whom the firm has no explicit buyer or supplier contracts but whose cooperation is 
nevertheless required in order for the firm to create and capture value, and increase the probability that a 
business plan will proceed on schedule and on budget (Henisz, Dorobantu and Nartey, 2013). Thus, from 
a high-level perspective, because growing firms must maintain their license to operate, and because a 
green image can help in this regard, they have incentives to greenwash.  In particular, when firms expand, 
either through modifying existing facilities, or building new facilities, they must go through various 
regulatory approval processes (Environmental Law Institute, 2007).  These include New Source Review 
(NSR) under the Clean Air Act, under which new and modified air pollution sources are subject to 
preconstruction review and permitting (Decker, 2003). Because NSR permits are issued on a project-by-
project basis, when a firm wishes to expand or modify an existing plant, an NSR permit is required. 
Depending on the frequency of modifications, a single plant can have several different NSR permits over 
the course of its operating life (Decker, 2003). Evidence suggests that government regulators treat firms 
more favorably in the regulatory process when they have taken voluntary actions to improve their 
environmental performance, especially through participation in government-initiated programs. In 
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particular, regulators ease the issuing of NSR permits for modification projects or new facilities (Decker, 
2003).  Regulators also lessen the extent of scrutiny for firms that make voluntary environmental 
improvements, reducing the frequency of costly environmental inspections and enforcement actions 
(Innes and Sam, 2008). Overall, growing firms thus have greater need of strategies to build positive 
environmental reputations and regulatory relationships and stronger incentives to greenwash, especially 
via corporate involvement in programs that are under the aegis of government. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Growing firms are more likely to engage in greenwashing.   
 
Given a firm’s rate of growth, however, we also expect that closer scrutiny by external 
stakeholders lessens the extent of greenwash (Delmas and  Burbano, 2011; Lyon and Maxwell, 2011; 
Lyon and Montgomery, 2013; Bowen, 2014).  Empirical evidence supports this notion, as well.  Firms 
were less likely to participate in the DOE’s misleading Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Registry when they 
were headquartered in states with a higher density of Sierra Club members (Kim and Lyon, 2011).  Firms 
disclosed their environmental footprints more completely when they were headquartered in countries with 
a higher density of environmental NGO members (Marquis and Toffel, 2013).  Firms produced more 
substantive corporate social responsibility reports when they were more likely to be monitored by 
government authorities (Marquis and Qian, 2014).  In a similar fashion, we expect that firms will be less 
likely to engage in greenwash when external stakeholders such as regulators and environmental groups 
exert greater scrutiny over the firm’s representations.  
An important question is whether increased scrutiny should have a direct effect on greenwash, or 
should serve as a moderator of the effect of growth on greenwash.  The papers cited in the previous 
paragraph find evidence of a direct effect of scrutiny on greenwash, but they do not allow for the 
possibility of brownwash.  If external scrutiny pressures firms to connect rhetoric and reality more closely, 
then scrutiny should moderate both incentives to greenwash and incentives to brownwash.  Thus, the 
direct effect of scrutiny on greenwash and the direct effect of scrutiny on brownwash will tend to cancel 
10 
 
one another out, and it will be impossible to identify a direct effect of scrutiny.  Instead, the specification 
needs to condition the effect of scrutiny upon whether the firm is growing, hence tending to greenwash 
rather than brownwash, and we therefore treat scrutiny as a moderator of the effect of growth.   
 
Hypothesis 1A: The effect of growth on greenwash is attenuated by scrutiny from external stakeholders. 
 
Next, we identify circumstances under which brownwash is more likely to occur.  It has been 
suggested in the literature that firms may systematically underreport their social activities in order to 
disguise their associated costs (Ullmann, 1985). Shareholders may suspect that the manager is pursuing 
social responsibility programs at the expense of other programs that can more directly further 
shareholders' interests (Friedman, 1970; Ullmann, 1985).  Previous studies suggest that social 
responsibility programs are likely to have negative implications for firm performance in the short run, 
even if they are beneficial in the long run (Khanna and Damon, 1999).  Furthermore, recent empirical 
findings demonstrate that shareholders may respond negatively to a firm’s environmentally friendly 
practices, echoing the large earlier literature that making environmental improvements is costly.  For 
example, Jacobs et al. (2010) found that corporate voluntary emissions reductions generated on average a 
statistically significant negative return of -.95%, and that non-governmental awards met with a 
statistically significant negative abnormal return of -.26%. Similarly, Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn (2011) 
found that the stock market responded negatively by -1% to corporate announcements of voluntary 
reductions in greenhouse emissions, as well as to announcements that a firm had joined the EPA’s 
voluntary Climate Leaders program.  Finally, Lyon et al. (2013) found that the Chinese stock market as 
well as the Hong Kong stock market responded negatively by roughly -0.8% to announcements that a 
privately-owned firm had received a green company award.  In light of these findings, we posit that as 
investor pressure intensifies, shareholders become the most salient stakeholder, thereby creating pressure 
to avoid disclosing information about social and environmental practices that could raise the firm’s costs.   
11 
 
One circumstance under which shareholders become a markedly more salient stakeholder group 
is when a firm undergoes a change from governance via rate-of-return regulation on capital investment to 
governance via competition. How firms manage the transition from a regulated to a deregulated 
environment has been a topic of interest in strategy research (Mahon and Murray, 1980; 1981; Delmas, 
Russo, and Montes-Sancho, 2007; Kim, 2013). In a regulated environment, firms are relatively shielded 
from pressure from shareholders because they are essentially governed by one or more industry-specific 
regulatory authorities. For example, electric utility companies are regulated by the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) and by the state public utility commissions. Regulators can allow or 
forbid firms’ actions that affect profitability, and also directly determine the allowed rate of return on 
capital investment. Under these circumstances, regulators are inevitably the most salient stakeholder 
group. Deregulation, however, changes the scenario and exposes firms to greater uncertainty and risks, in 
particular with respect to rate of return.  These increased risks naturally draw the attention of investors, 
and force firms to weigh social and environmental spending more carefully and less favorably.  Indeed, 
prior research has found that deregulation leads firms to reduce their substantive capital-intensive 
investments in environmental protection (Fowlie, 2010).  Thus, we expect shareholders to become the 
most salient stakeholder group under deregulation, and we hypothesize that this in turn pressures firms to 
withhold disclosure of costly social and environmental practices.   
 
Hypothesis 2: Firms operating in a deregulated environment are more likely to brownwash. 
 
In a deregulated environment, salience of shareholders increases even further when profits are 
low because firms with low profitability face increased market scrutiny (Morrow, Sirmon, Hitt, and 
Holcomb, 2007). In Mitchell et al. (1997), shareholders are ordinarily classified as a “dominant 
stakeholder” because they possess power and legitimacy.  But, when the firm’s profits are low, the 
urgency of responding can make shareholders the “definitive stakeholder,” as happened to several firms 
in 1993 when their performance plummeted, prompting the replacement of top managers at IBM, General 
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Motors and other firms (Mitchell et al., 1997).  We thus hypothesize that incentives for firms to 
brownwash are enhanced when the firm’s profits are low in a deregulated environment because the 
salience of shareholders as a group increases.   
 
Hypothesis 2A: Low profits in a deregulated environment make a firm more likely to brownwash.   
 
While shareholders become more salient when profits are low, external stakeholders are likely to 
become less salient (Mitchell et al., 1997).  For example, when a firm’s sales quantity declines, its 
environmental footprint automatically shrinks, just as a drop in U.S. greenhouse gas emissions created a 
modest silver lining to the Great Recession of 2008/2009  (Broder, 2011).  Thus, the urgency of the 
claims of environmental advocates is diminished.  Nevertheless, these stakeholders remain relevant, and 
hence the definitiveness of shareholders during a period of low profits will be mitigated by the intensity 
of scrutiny from external stakeholders.  Because brownwash makes the firm look less environmentally 
friendly than it really is, it runs the risk of exposing the firm to criticism from the media or from 
environmentalists (Bansal and Roth, 2000; Bansal and Clelland, 2004; King, 2008).  Thus, even when 
profits are low, we expect the firm to hew more closely to the truth when it experiences greater scrutiny 
from external stakeholders such as regulators or environmental activists.   
 
Hypothesis 2B: The effect of investor pressure on brownwash is attenuated by scrutiny from external 
stakeholders. 
 
THE VOLUNTARY GREENHOUSE GAS REGISTRY 
The Voluntary Reporting of Greenhouse Gases Program was established by section 1605(b) of the Energy 
Policy Act of 1992. The 1605(b) program provides a formal vehicle for companies to report their 
13 
 
greenhouse gas emissions, and their reductions of emissions over time.  It allows public electronic access, 
so the public as well as government and firms can access the program’s database.7   
According to the Department of Energy (DOE)’s Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Registry website, 
the benefits of participation for firms are primarily in the form of publicity and improved relationships 
with regulators.  A more strategic motivation, consultants advised, was that a “proactive stance that 
includes voluntary greenhouse gas emissions reduction efforts may delay regulatory action” (Trexler and 
McFall 1993).  Should regulatory action be unavoidable, participation would also be advantageous 
because it could “establish a basis for requesting consideration of prior actions in a possible future ‘credit 
for early reductions’ program” (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2005).   
An important aspect of the Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program is that it was designed 
with few hard and fast rules about how to report reductions.  Voluntary reporters could choose to report 
reductions at the “entity level” (entire firm) or at the “project level” (individual reduction project), and 
could define the boundary of the entity or project.  Voluntary reporters also had leeway in choosing either 
a historical baseline emissions level or calculating a hypothetical one.  Reporters could either report 
reductions in absolute emissions or reductions in emissions intensity, and could report indirect reductions 
or sequestration as well as direct reductions.
8
 All this flexibility gave firms substantial ability to shape the 
presentation of their emissions profile. 
The projects reported range from reducing emissions at the electric power generation, 
transmission and distribution stages to demand-side management and carbon sequestration.  Abatement 
strategies at the generation stage include switching from high- to low-carbon fuel sources, improving 
plant availability at low-carbon generators such as nuclear and hydro, plant efficiency improvement, 
increases in low- or zero-emitting generation capacity, decreases in high-emitting capacity, and retirement 
                                                 
7
 For details about the program, see Kim and Lyon (2011). 
8
 Direct reductions refer to greenhouse gas reductions from sources owned by the reporter such as power plant 
emissions reductions at the electricity generation stage. Indirect reductions refer to greenhouse gas reductions from 
sources not owned by the reporter but somehow affected by reporter actions such as from end-users via demand side 
management programs. Sequestration refers to the removal and storage of carbon from the atmosphere in carbon 
sinks such as trees and  plants. See Voluntary Reporting of Greenhouse Gases 2003, EIA (2005). 
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of high-emitting plants. Reductions at the transmission and distribution stages involve reduced losses in 
the delivery of electricity from power plants to end use through the use of high-efficiency transformers, 
transmission line improvements, etc. Demand side management projects aim to improve end-use energy 
efficiency of both stationary and mobile sources in the industrial, commercial, residential, agricultural, 
and transportation sectors. Carbon sequestration projects report carbon fixing through afforestation, 
reforestation, etc. Projects on other greenhouse gases such as methane are also reported to the Voluntary 
Reporting of Greenhouse Gases Program.  
 
DATA AND METHODS 
We have compiled U.S. investor-owned electric utility companies’ data over the period 1995-2003 from 
various sources. The self-claimed greenhouse gas emissions reductions data were collected from the 
DOE’s Voluntary Reporting of Greenhouse Gases Program website.9 This program was established in 
1994, went through a prolonged modification process starting in 2004, and has been suspended starting in 
2011 due to reductions in budget appropriations. Thus, the 1995-2003 period gives us the longest period 
over which the voluntary reporting data are both available and consistent.  
Our sample is limited to those who participate in the DOE’s Voluntary Reporting of Greenhouse 
Gases Program.
10
 Firm-specific financial, operational, and fuel consumption and environmental 
performance-related data are based on the FERC Form 1 electric utilities report to the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) and obtained from Platts, a company specializing in energy industry 
data.  State-level variables were collected from a variety of sources, including the Sierra Club, the League 
of Conservation Voters, the U.S. Census Bureau’s Government Employment and Payroll, the 
Environmental Protection Agency, and the Database of State Incentives for Renewable Energy. When 
firms operate in more than one state we weight the state-level variables by the percentage of the firm’s 
                                                 
9
 http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/frntvrgg.html . We use only direct reductions reported to the program, which is 
comparable to what is reported to the FERC Form 1.    
10
 Kim and Lyon (2011) study the factors affecting firms’ decisions to participate in the program. 
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revenues that come from each state. The total number of participants is 54 investor-owned electric utilities 
over the period 1995-2003, with a total of 396 firm-year observations.  
The biggest advantage of this database is that it allows us to directly compare firms’ reported and 
actual greenhouse gas emissions reductions. As mentioned, we collected reported greenhouse gas 
emissions reductions from the DOE’s Voluntary Registry website. We calculated actual greenhouse gas 
emissions reductions based on fuel consumption disclosed to the FERC. The FERC Form 1 data form the 
basis for most empirical work on electric utilities.  They have been collected for decades, must be signed 
and certified as true by a corporate officer and must be independently certified by a CPA.  Significant 
penalties can be applied to the corporate officer in charge of certifying the FERC Form 1 information, as 
well as to the company more broadly. None of this is true for the Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Reporting 
Program, which thereby makes it inherently much less credible than the FERC Form 1. 
To translate fuel consumption disclosed to the FERC to actual greenhouse gas emissions 
reductions, we first calculate total carbon input using carbon coefficients (in Million Metric Tons per 
Quadrillion Btu): 25.97 for Coal, 14.47 for Natural Gas, 17.51 for Refinery Gas, 19.95 for Distillate fuel 
(Oil-L), 21.49 for Residual fuel (Oil-H) and 27.85 for Petroleum Coke (US Energy Information 
Administration, 2004, p.189).
  
These estimates are then converted to carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions by 
multiplying by 3.7, the molecular weight of CO2 relative to carbon. This variable thus captures fossil fuel 
based greenhouse gas emissions such as CO2 and methane (CH4) as CO2 equivalents.  
We take this approach rather than using direct observations from the continuous emissions 
monitoring system (CEMS) for two reasons. First, despite increasing interest in carbon capture and 
storage technologies (CCS) to reduce carbon emissions from fossil fuel power plants, these technologies 
were not technologically or economically viable during our sample period.
11
  Without end-of-pipe 
technology to reduce carbon emissions for the electric power industry, what goes in comes out. 
Accordingly, by using data on how much carbon content each type of fuel has and how much each type of 
fuel was used, we can calculate actual carbon emissions. Second, the Natural Resources Defense Council 
                                                 
11
 Electric Power Research Institute http://sites.epri.com/refcard/tech_ccs.html (July 2013) 
16 
 
(NRDC) reported that turbulent flow in the emissions stack could bias the CEMS estimates upward by 
10-30 percent.
12
  NRDC also found cases where the CEMS data deviate from the emissions estimates 
from the US Energy Information Administration or the FERC when the latter two agreed for the most part. 
In these cases of discrepancies, NRDC used the FERC-based estimates. In cases where fuel consumption 
data were not available, this paper supplemented the fuel consumption-based estimates with adjusted 
CEMS estimates to increase the number of observations.
13
 Below we describe our variables in detail. 
Table 1 summarizes them. 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Dependent Variable 
Deviation between reported and actual emissions reductions. We focus on the accuracy with which a 
firm’s reported emissions reductions correspond to the actual change in its greenhouse gas emissions.  To 
do so, we compute the difference between reported and actual emissions reductions, normalized by the 
firm’s level of reported reductions.  That is, we compute 
 
R A
X
R

  
where R is the reported level of reductions and A is the actual level of reductions.  Compared to a simple 
measure of the gap between reported and actual emissions, which might be skewed by the presence of a 
few large firms, our measure is normalized by the size of the firm’s reported emissions reductions.  While 
we could have normalized by dividing through by actual emissions reductions, we chose to normalize by 
reported reductions because A can be negative if net emissions increased over time.   
Using the continuous variable that measures the deviation between reported and actual emissions 
reductions as our dependent variable, we test the hypotheses related to the drivers of greenwash and 
                                                 
12
 www.nrdc.org/air/energy/rbr/append.asp. 
13
 An adjustment factor is calculated to convert CEMS based CO2 emissions data to fuel-based CO2 estimates. The 
fuel-based estimates are regressed on CEMS data and the inverse of the coefficient, 0.7527, is used as an adjustment 
factor. This aligns well with NRDC’s report that continuous emissions monitoring data could be biased upward by 
10-30 percent relative to fuel-based estimates. www.nrdc.org/air/energy/rbr/append.asp. 
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brownwash. We use a specification with firm-level fixed effects because firm-level dummies are jointly 
significant (F(53, 321)=7.85, P-value=0.0) and the Sargan-Hansen statistic—the modified version of the 
Hausman test for clustered data—rejects the null hypothesis in favor of the fixed-effects specification 
(Sargan-Hansen statistic 867.923  Chi-sq(20)   P-value = 0.0).
14
 The residuals of our fixed-effects 
regressions show significant cross-sectional dependence (Pesaran's test of cross sectional independence = 
14.899, P-value= 0.0), and thus we estimate fixed-effect regressions with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors 
that are robust to cross-sectional dependence as well as robust to common panel problems, i.e., 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity (Hoechle, 2007; Driscoll and Kraay, 1998).
15
 
 
Independent Variables 
Firm Growth We focus on growth in output, which basically captures growth in the amount of electricity 
generated. This measure has the advantage relative to sales revenue that it is not confounded by changes 
in price in measuring growth over time. Growth in output is calculated as percentage changes in annual 
output, that is, percentage changes in annual net generation for each electric utility (Gollop and Roberts, 
1983). 
Profits We hypothesize that under-reporting of social activities is more likely to occur when firm profits 
are low in a deregulated environment. We measure firm profits with net income.  Net income represents 
managers’ primary fiscal responsibility and reflects bottom-line performance (Voss, Cable and Voss, 
2006).  In regulated markets, the central focus is on a firm’s rate of return on assets, which can lead firms 
to overcapitalize (Averch and Johnson, 1962).  However, in deregulated markets investors are free to 
pursue profit maximization directly (Fabrizio et al. 2007), which is better captured by net income.  Since 
our Hypothesis 2A focuses on deregulated markets, we use net income as an explanatory variable.   
                                                 
14
 For simplicity, in this paragraph we provide statistical test results for the first model in Table 3. The test results 
are similar for other models. 
15
 The procedure is implemented using the Stata command xtscc. 
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Deregulation The U.S. Energy Information Administration provides the status of retail deregulation in 
each state, which has been used in prior studies (Delmas, Russo, Montes-Sancho, 2007; Kim, 2013).
16
 To 
take into account the possibility that firm behavior may be affected earlier than the actual implementation 
of retail deregulation legislation (Fabrizio, Rose and Wolfram, 2007), we create a dummy variable that 
indicates either the enactment of legislation or the issuance of a regulatory order, whichever is earlier. 
Following Delmas et al. (2007) and Kim (2013), for each company we weight the dummy variable by the 
share of the firm’s electricity sales in each state. For example, if a company sells 50% of its electricity 
sales in a deregulated state and the remaining 50% in a regulated state, the weighted deregulation variable 
for this company takes the value of 0.5.
17
 
Interactions with External Scrutiny We measure external scrutiny using three variables. The first is the 
average of the League of Conservation Voters (LCV) scores for political representatives in a firm’s state. 
The LCV scores are based on the voting records of the Representatives and Senators in the U.S. Congress 
in favor of an environmental agenda, ranging from 0 to 100, with 100 being the highest score. Thus, the 
LCV scores measure the preferences of a state’s elected representatives (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 
2010), and to the extent legislators represent their constituents’ preferences (Kassinis and Vafeas, 2006), 
LCV scores also embody the citizens’ general sentiment towards environmental issues (Delmas, Russo, 
and Montes-Sancho, 2007; Doshi, Dowell, and Toffel, 2013). 
The second variable is membership in one of the major environmental NGOs, the Sierra Club, at 
the state level. The Sierra Club is the largest and most influential grassroots environmental organization in 
the U.S.  Some Sierra Club chapters run websites titled “Don’t be duped by greenwashing,”18 and the 
Sierra Club, along with Greenpeace, recently attacked greenwash ads from the oil sands industry.
19
   This 
variable thus measures the extent of NGO pressure (Maxwell et al. 2000; Innes and Sam, 2008; Sine and 
                                                 
16
 http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/chg_str/restructure.pdf 
17
 Deregulation at the state level started in the late 1990s, so our sample provides an appropriate period to study the 
effect of deregulation.  In our sample, 22 out of 54 firms were operating in one or more states that went through 
deregulation during the period studied. These states were Arizona, California, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Texas. 
18
 http://www.sangorgonio.sierraclub.org/mountains/greenwash.htm 
19
 http://www.sierraclub.org/environmentallaw/tarsands/ 
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Lee, 2009) and also may be considered to represent the environmental preferences of the population of 
the state in which a firm operates (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2010; Kassinis and Vafeas, 2006).  We 
obtained this variable directly from the Sierra Club.  
The third variable makes use of the number of state-level formal enforcement actions associated 
with environmental issues in the last five years, which is available from the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA)’s Enforcement and Compliance History Online (ECHO) database. The 5-year enforcement 
history has been frequently used in previous studies (see for example, Broulhle, Griffiths and Wolverton, 
2009). We normalize the number of state-level formal enforcement actions associated with environmental 
issues by the number of EPA regulated major facilities in the state, which comes from the ECHO database. 
This variable measures the extent to which a state inspects polluting facilities and takes enforcement 
actions against violators, thus indicating the intensity of regulatory scrutiny to which facilities are actually 
subjected in each state (Gray and Shimshack, 2011).   
 
Control Variables 
We include a set of control variables to reflect important dimensions of firm heterogeneity and external 
environmental factors that may affect the deviation between reported and actual emissions reductions. 
Firm size/Visibility. Visible firms are more likely to be subject to external pressures (Delmas and 
Montes-Sancho, 2010; Meznar and Nigh, 1995).  We thus explicitly control for firm size/visibility as 
measured by revenues (Patten, 2002; Albuquerque, 2009). In addition to being subject to greater pressures, 
large firms may enjoy economies of scale in compliance, or have better access to capital markets and 
hence lower costs of new investments (Khanna and Damon, 1999; Innes and Sam, 2008). 
Intra-Firm Communication Delmas and  Burbano (2011) discuss how a lack of effective intra-firm 
communication can lead to greenwash.  Thus, we consider factors that might hinder effective intra-firm 
communication: the number of subsidiaries of a firm, the number of states in which a firm operates, and a 
dummy variable that indicates whether a firm is undergoing mergers and acquisitions.  For firms with 
20 
 
many subsidiaries, those operating in many states, or those making adjustments between an acquiring 
firm and a target firm, effective intra-firm communication may be more challenging than otherwise.  
State's Resource Allocation We control for a state's resource allocation for environmental issues 
generally, as represented in state budgets and employment (Kassinis and Vafeas, 2006); specifically, we 
measure the ratio of state environmental budget relative to total state budget, and the ratio of state natural 
resources employees to total state employees.  The first variable captures the priority assigned to 
environmental issues and the second captures a state's long-term commitment to environmental protection 
and to building institutional capacity to support that commitment (Kassinis and Vafeas, 2006). State 
employment data are collected from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Government Employment & Payroll.20 
State budget data come from the Council of State Governments.
21
  Because these variables include funds 
and employees devoted to a wide range of natural resources and environmental activities, we use them as 
indicators of overall state commitment to the environment, rather than scrutiny specifically.
22
  
Renewable Portfolio Standards Although there was no federal mandate to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions during our sample period, for the electric power industry the closest state-level regulatory 
restrictions are Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPSs). An RPS typically requires that a certain 
percentage of electric utilities’ electricity generation come from renewable energy sources.  The variable 
we use is calculated by dividing the % goal stipulated in a state’s RPS by the difference between the goal 
year and the enacted or effective year, whichever comes first (Kim, 2013).
 
State RPS data are obtained 
from www.dsireusa.org. 
Other Firm Characteristics We include two variables designed to capture other potential sources of 
heterogeneity across firms related to carbon emissions.  Capacity factor refers to the ratio of energy 
generated to the maximum that could have been generated; it is calculated by dividing net generation 
(MWh) by nameplate capacity (MW) times 8,760 (the number of hours in a year).  Changes in CO2 
                                                 
20
 http://www.census.gov/govs/apes 
21
 We thank Jay Shimshack for generously sharing this data with us. 
22
 We also tested whether the control variables for state resource allocation played a significant role in moderating 
the effect of growth on greenwashing, but the interaction terms were insignificant.  The same was true for 
interaction effects with net income. 
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emissions refer to changes in CO2 equivalent emissions, that is, it includes carbon-based pollutants other 
than CO2. This variable captures changes in the overall portfolio of electricity generation from the 
perspective of greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
RESULTS 
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the variables used in our analysis along with the correlations 
between each of the variables.  
[Table 2 about here] 
Most correlations are relatively low.  Two measures of a state's resource allocation for 
environmental issues, percentage of state budget allocated to environmental issues and percentage of state 
employees allocated to environmental issues, are highly correlated with each other. We ran regressions 
alternating the two variables instead of including them together and the results are very similar. 
Interaction terms involving the external scrutiny variables are highly correlated across each other. We 
thus include interaction terms separately in regressions.  
 Figure 1 shows the extent of decoupling for firms participating in the DOE’s Voluntary Reporting 
of Greenhouse Gases Program, with the horizontal axis presenting the difference between reported and 
actual emissions reductions measured on a percentage basis and the vertical axis giving the corresponding 
probability density. The mean of the distribution is 2.5% and the median is 5.5%.  The most frequent 
deciles of the difference between reported and actual emissions occur around zero.  Thus, many firms 
neither engage in greenwash or in brownwash. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
We turn now to an empirical analysis of the drivers of greenwashing and brownwashing.  Table 3 
shows regression results using firm-level fixed-effects with standard errors robust to autocorrelation, 
heteroskedasticity, and cross-sectional dependence.  
[Table 3 about here] 
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We find support for Hypothesis 1 that growing firms are likely to over-report emissions 
reductions, with the coefficient consistently significant at the 1% level except in two models where the 
interaction term between growth and deregulation is included. Growing firms are likely to face more 
interactions with stakeholders in the regulatory arena, and to participate in voluntary environmental 
actions to soften environmental regulatory pressures.  Regarding Hypothesis 1A, we ran regressions with 
interactions between growth and our external scrutiny variables. The three interaction variables are 
significant and work in the direction of reducing the extent of over-reporting. For example, based on 
model (3), in a state with no Sierra Club members, a one percent increase in a firm’s growth rate leads to 
63.2% more greenwashing.  However, if the state had 1.722 Sierra Club members per thousand citizens 
(the sample mean), the effect of a one percent increase in the growth rate would be reduced to 22.6%.  
We find support for Hypothesis 2 that deregulation is likely to lead to brownwash. In a regulated 
environment, firms are relatively shielded from pressure from shareholders because they are essentially 
governed by regulatory authorities. With deregulation, this shield is lifted and regulators are no longer the 
most salient stakeholder group. Instead, the salience of shareholders increases, driving brownwash.  Also 
consistent with this argument, the coefficients for the interaction variable between net income and 
deregulation are positive and significant in most specifications, and outweigh the size of the coefficients 
for the negative net income variable. Since the deregulation dummy takes the value of one in a 
deregulated environment, these findings provide support for our Hypothesis 2A that lower profits increase 
the likelihood of under-reporting in a deregulated environment. More specifically, based on model (6), in 
a deregulated environment, a one billion dollar decrease in net income leads to 15.7% more 
underreporting. Regarding Hypothesis 2B, we ran regressions with interactions between net income and 
our external scrutiny variables and found that they are significant in the direction we hypothesized, 
although the significance is not as strong as in the case of the growth variable. That is, the effect of 
investor pressure on brownwash is weakly attenuated by scrutiny from external stakeholders. For example, 
based on model (12), in a deregulated state with no Sierra Club members, a one billion dollar decrease in 
net income leads to 188.1% more brownwashing.  However, if the state had 1.722 Sierra Club members 
23 
 
per thousand citizens (the sample mean), the effect of a one billion dollar decrease in net income would 
be reduced to 133.4% more brownwashing.  
As we mentioned in the Introduction, we performed a set of robustness checks for our main 
effects using various relative performance variables. Based on our theory development, the importance of 
growth comes from increased interactions with stakeholders in the regulatory arena. Thus, absolute 
growth matters, whereas relative growth compared to peer firms does not necessarily matter. On the 
contrary, under the circumstances where investor pressure intensifies, both absolute and relative profits 
matter because the importance of profits comes from increased salience of shareholders who can shift 
their investments to more profitable firms. Thus, to provide further support for our theory, we created 
various relative growth and profits variables based on the prior literature,
23
 and ran regressions replacing 
the absolute growth and profits variables in Table 3. For simplicity, only the regression coefficients for 
the relative growth and profits variables and their interactions with deregulation are shown in Table 4. 
The results for the other variables are similar to those shown in Table 3. As expected, the relative growth 
variables in Panel A of Table 4 are mostly not significant, and the relative profit variables in Panel B of 
Table 4 show similar results as the absolute profit variable. This supplementary evidence provides 
additional confidence that our empirical results are capturing the hypothesized effects in a robust manner. 
It is worth noting that our sample is restricted to firms that chose to participate in the Voluntary 
Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program.  Kim and Lyon (2011) study the decisions of electric utilities to 
either join the program or not.  That paper found that participants tended to be large firms facing strong 
regulatory pressure, and that pressure from environmental groups reduced the likelihood of participation.    
Non-participants were more likely to be shrinking, so according to our Hypothesis 1, they should have 
been more likely to brownwash.  We obviously cannot test this since they did not join the program, but 
their decision to not participate is broadly consistent with the hypothesis, since they were effectively 
                                                 
23
 Relative growth and relative profits are estimated in several ways: relative to industry (Aggarwal and Samwick, 
1999), relative to small/large firms (Bizjak, Lemmon, Naveen, 2008), relative to size quartiles (Albuquerque, 2009), 
relative to revenue based on the residuals obtained by OLS regressions (King and Lenox, 2000). Relative profits are 
also estimated relative to firm output based on the residuals obtained by OLS regressions. Since the growth variable 
builds on firm output, this approach was not used for estimating relative growth. 
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understating their environmental improvements by remaining silent.  Thus, our empirical findings in this 
paper may understate the frequency of brownwashing in the general population of firms. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 The decoupling literature has argued that decoupling is especially likely when institutional 
environments are multifaceted and conflicting institutional demands for conformity exist (Oliver, 1991; 
Seo and Creed, 2002; Marquis and Lounsbury, 2007; Kraatz and Block, 2008; Purdy and Gray, 2009; 
Pache and Santos, 2010; Smith and Lewis, 2011). The direction of decoupling identified in the literature, 
however, is limited to exaggeration (“greenwash”) of organizational actions, with the exception of 
Ullmann (1985). We have proposed the possibility of undue modesty (“brownwash”) about organizational 
actions as another decoupling possibility, especially as they relate to environmental, social and 
governance issues. We have further proposed that which form of decoupling is more prevalent depends on 
the balance of power among competing stakeholder groups (Mitchell et al., 1997), emphasizing that 
stakeholders’ preferences may change over time, and that they interact with changing firm characteristics, 
to determine the direction of decoupling.     
In the context of environmental disclosure, we have shown that firm growth leads to greenwash 
due to an anticipation of increased interactions with stakeholders in the regulatory arena. We have also 
shown that deregulation leads to brownwash due to increased salience of shareholders, and that this effect 
is exacerbated by lower profits. That is, in a deregulated environment, lower profits lead to more 
brownwash. As one would expect, this relationship holds for both absolute and relative profits compared 
to peer firms. We further show that the extent of both greenwash and brownwash is attenuated by external 
scrutiny in the form of NGO and regulatory pressures.  
 While our results suggest that certain stakeholders are important drivers of greenwash and 
brownwash, other stakeholders we have not examined might be relevant as well. For example, in 
marketing, it has been noted that companies have to tread a fine line in marketing their social activities to 
customers (O'Sullivan, 1997).  
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“If they don't say enough about their charity links consumers believe the companies are hiding 
something and if they say too much they believe charities are being exploited by the big 
corporations. It makes the promotion of such schemes one of the most delicate jobs in marketing.” 
 
 Whether customer pressure drives greenwash or brownwash is likely to depend upon the nature of 
the product and its production process, as well as customer beliefs about them. Large marketing and 
environmental economics literatures find that social performance influences consumers’ product 
perceptions, consumers’ product responses, and consumers’ willingness to pay (e.g. Loureiro and Lotade 
2005; Roe et al. 2011; Eichholtz et al 2011). The rapidly growing number of “green claims” made on 
product packaging suggests that companies believe some final consumers prefer green products.
24
  At the 
same time, customers may have concerns that greater emphasis on social and environmental impacts may 
degrade product performance. A 2007 study of 7,751 consumers around the world identifies negative 
perceptions toward environmentally friendly products as one of the barriers to buying green product 
(Bonini and Oppenheim, 2008). For example, early hybrid cars had less power than non-hybrid cars. 
Compact fluorescent light bulbs also had to overcome problems: early versions were slow to light up, had 
weak light when they did illuminate, and didn’t fit properly into most normal light fixtures (Bonini and 
Oppenheim, 2008).  Identifying circumstances under which stakeholders such as customers drive 
greenwash or brownwash is an interesting topic for future research.
25
 
One reason the Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program we studied can be said to facilitate 
greenwash or brownwash is that its requirements were intentionally loose, to encourage wide firm 
participation.  For example, the Program gave firms the choice of whether to report on the basis of 
specific emissions reductions projects, or on the basis of the overall entity footprint (Kim and Lyon, 
2011).  We conducted two-stage regressions to explore the impact of these alternative reporting modes on 
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 See Terrachoice Group Inc.’s http://sinsofgreenwashing.org/ for more information on changes in the extent of 
‘green’ labeling over time. 
25
 We conducted a series of regressions that included fraction of sales to residential customers as an independent 
variable, since prior studies suggest that residential customers are more likely to be sensitive to environmental 
claims (see for example, Delmas, Russo, and Montes-Sancho, 2007).  Unfortunately, this variable proved to be a 
constraint on sample size, reducing it by 45 firm-year observations.  This changes the sample means for our key 
variables significantly (e.g., for the net income variable, chi-sq(1)=33.28, P-value=0.0) and causes the precision with 
which we are able to estimate our main independent variables to drop.  Furthermore, the fraction of sales to 
residential customers variable is never statistically significant.  Thus, we do not report these regressions in the paper. 
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greenwash and brownwash, but they were statistically insignificant and did not affect other coefficients in 
the regression results. In fixed-effect models, of course, the alternative reporting modes drop out because 
they are time-invariant. One interesting result that emerged in the process, however, was a tendency of 
firms located within the same region of the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) to adopt 
similar reporting modes.  Normative pressures to adopt business practices deemed to be legitimate may be 
transmitted through such professional organizations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), and under this 
circumstance, strategic choice may be important at the collective level, not at the level of single firm 
(Astley and Fombrun, 1983).  While our results provide some evidence of the existence of such a process, 
it did not play a significant role in determining the difference between reported and actual emissions 
reductions, so we do not report these results here. 
Our empirical analysis was conducted for an environmental issue in an industry in which 
regulatory institutions place serious constraints on corporate behavior, and one may wonder whether our 
results are likely to generalize to other settings.  We note that although economic regulation of utilities is 
a relatively special case, most heavily polluting industries―such as chemicals, steel, pulp and paper, and 
oil refining―are subject to significant environmental regulation, which in itself can create a threat of 
external scrutiny.  Furthermore, growth in any industry with environmental impacts typically requires 
permits issued through government institutions.  Thus, we expect that the growth effect that we have 
identified, and the mitigating impact of external scrutiny, will generalize to environmental issues in other 
industry settings.  Furthermore, social issues such as sweatshop labor and equal employment opportunity 
are amenable to pressure from secondary stakeholders (Harrison and Scorse, 2010), and are likely to 
generate dynamics similar to those for environmental issues.  Corporate relationships with shareholders 
are also likely to be similar in less heavily regulated industries, with their salience increasing with 
decreasing profits.  Thus, although our empirical setting is special in some respects, we expect the main 
relationships we identify to hold in other settings; nevertheless, further research confirming the generality 
of our findings would be worthwhile.  
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Table 1. Summary of Variables 
 
Variables Summary 
Dependent variable  
Deviation between reported and actual 
emissions reductions 
Continuous variable that indicates the difference between reported and actual 
emissions reductions (%) 
Independent variables  
Growth in output  Continuous variable that indicates percentage growth in output relative to year t-1 
Net Income  Continuous net income variable  
Deregulation Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the state enacted retail deregulation 
legislation or issued regulatory order that year or in prior years, and 0 otherwise. For 
each firm, it is weighted by the share of the electricity sales in each state. 
Deregulation × Net Income Continuous net income variable interacted with deregulation 
Growth × LCV Continuous growth variable interacted with LCV score 
Growth × Sierra Continuous growth variable interacted with Sierra Club density 
Growth × Enforcement Continuous growth variable interacted with Enforcement 
Deregulation × Net Income × LCV Continuous net income variable  interacted with deregulation and LCV score 
Deregulation × Net Income × Sierra Continuous net income variable  interacted with deregulation and Sierra Club density 
Deregulation × Net Income × Enforcement Continuous net income variable interacted with deregulation and Enforcement 
Control variables  
Sierra Club density Sierra Club membership per thousand population at the state level 
Capacity factor The ratio of energy generated to the maximum that could have been generated. 
LCV score: average Average of the League of Conservation Voters (LCV)’s scores for US Senate and 
House 
RPS index State-level Renewable Portfolio Standards 
Operating revenue Revenue from sales of electricity (109 $). 
Changes in CO2 emissions  Continuous variable that indicates percentage change in CO2 (equivalent) emissions 
relative to t-1 
Number of subsidiaries Number of subsidiaries  
Number of states Number of states in which the firm operates 
Mergers & acquisitions Dummy variable that indicates whether the firm is undergoing mergers and 
acquisitions 
State environmental spending  Percent of state budget allocated to environmental issues (%) 
State environmental employee  Percent of state employees allocated to environmental issues (%) 
Enforcement State-level 5-year formal enforcement actions associated with environmental issues 
normalized by the number of major facilities 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics and Variable Correlations 
 
 
Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) 
(1) 2.475 53.58 1.00 
                      
(2) 1.722 1.119 0.12 1.00 
                     
(3) 37.81 21.146 0.16 0.47 1.00 
                    
(4) 0.112 0.310 -0.10 0.16 0.06 1.00 
                   
(5) 0.091 0.078 -0.01 0.25 0.40 0.30 1.00 
                  
(6) 1.835 0.807 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.03 -0.08 1.00 
                 
(7) 3.733 1.122 0.03 -0.05 -0.12 0.13 -0.12 0.65 1.00 
                
(8) 0.521 0.155 0.23 0.10 -0.04 -0.12 -0.22 -0.13 -0.21 1.00 
               
(9) 1.721 1.728 0.06 0.54 0.22 0.11 0.30 0.17 -0.05 0.07 1.00 
              
(10) 5.682 3.819 -0.14 -0.42 -0.26 -0.03 -0.18 -0.39 -0.15 0.18 -0.25 1.00 
             
(11) 1.429 0.924 0.09 0.16 0.00 0.07 -0.03 0.29 0.24 0.15 0.18 -0.12 1.00 
            
(12) 0.098 0.298 0.04 0.03 0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.08 -0.08 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.04 1.00 
           
(13) 0.007 0.170 0.18 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.09 0.05 0.02 0.12 -0.10 0.01 0.01 -0.07 1.00 
          
(14) 0.061 0.367 0.08 -0.01 0.04 -0.06 -0.06 0.07 0.04 -0.15 -0.07 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 0.12 1.00 
         
(15) 0.166 0.288 0.08 0.27 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.13 -0.07 -0.01 0.58 -0.21 0.06 0.04 -0.07 -0.06 1.00 
        
(16) 0.352 0.460 -0.03 0.14 0.01 0.20 0.29 -0.48 -0.27 0.10 0.08 0.16 -0.08 0.07 -0.08 -0.06 -0.05 1.00 
       
(17) 0.051 0.172 -0.01 0.14 0.08 -0.02 0.20 -0.16 -0.15 -0.08 0.32 -0.02 0.00 0.05 -0.14 -0.07 0.49 0.39 1.00 
      
(18) 0.212 8.291 0.11 -0.07 -0.06 0.02 -0.11 0.05 0.06 0.08 -0.13 0.05 0.01 -0.07 0.87 0.09 -0.10 -0.07 -0.19 1.00 
     
(19) 0.004 0.335 0.11 -0.11 -0.06 0.02 -0.12 0.02 0.01 0.08 -0.14 0.03 0.00 -0.05 0.86 0.15 -0.10 -0.08 -0.22 0.89 1.00 
    
(20) -0.001 0.029 0.09 -0.06 -0.05 0.01 -0.08 0.04 0.03 0.09 -0.11 0.03 0.01 -0.06 0.76 0.04 -0.09 -0.05 -0.18 0.90 0.76 1.00 
   
(21) -0.004 0.132 0.10 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.05 0.02 0.03 0.04 -0.12 -0.01 0.00 -0.13 0.81 0.13 -0.08 -0.04 -0.16 0.71 0.73 0.72 1.00 
  
(22) 2.226 11.457 -0.04 0.18 0.18 -0.04 0.25 -0.08 -0.11 -0.12 0.31 -0.07 0.01 0.06 -0.14 -0.06 0.50 0.26 0.96 -0.21 -0.23 -0.19 -0.17 1.00 
 
(23) 0.116 0.761 0.00 0.18 0.11 -0.03 0.17 -0.01 -0.02 -0.08 0.24 -0.07 0.04 0.04 -0.10 -0.05 0.49 0.20 0.92 -0.14 -0.20 -0.14 -0.12 0.96 1.00 
(24) 0.007 0.043 -0.03 0.17 0.16 -0.01 0.25 -0.05 -0.08 -0.14 0.28 -0.07 0.02 0.04 -0.13 -0.06 0.50 0.23 0.94 -0.19 -0.23 -0.18 -0.16 0.99 0.97 
(1) Deviation between reported and actual emissions reductions (2) Sierra Club density (3) LCV score: average (4) RPS index (5) Enforcement  (6) State environmental spending (%) (7) State 
environmental employee (%) (8) Capacity factor (9) Operating revenue (10) Number of subsidiaries (11) Number of states (12) Mergers & acquisitions (13) Growth in output (14) Changes in CO2 
emissions (15) Net Income (16) Deregulation (17) Deregulation× Net Income (18) Growth × LCV  (19) Growth × Sierra (20) Growth × Enforcement (21) Deregulation × Growth  (22) Deregulation× Net 
Income × LCV  (23) Deregulation× Net Income × Sierra (24) Deregulation× Net Income × Enforcement  
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Table 3. Regressions with Firm-level Fixed Effects 
 
VARIABLES Difference between reported and actual emissions reductions (percent) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Sierra Club density 6.597 5.684 1.71 7.427 6.544* 6.917 6.015 2.434 7.635 6.755* 6.588 7.731* 8.138 
 
 
(4.515) (4.545) (4.734) (4.645) (3.569) (4.543) (4.575) (4.862) (4.657) (3.578) (4.342) (4.589) (5.072) 
 LCV score: average -0.0233 -0.0625 -0.0747 -0.0355 -0.0223 -0.0695 -0.104 -0.107 -0.0782 -0.0668 0.12 0.0683 0.0416 
 
 
(0.143) (0.148) (0.134) (0.143) (0.145) (0.142) (0.145) (0.135) (0.142) (0.144) (0.141) (0.139) (0.140) 
 RPS index -9.01 -6.85 -5.436 -8.087 -8.994 -4.5 -2.762 -2.157 -3.89 -4.434 -7.314 -5.86 -4.325 
 
 
(9.765) (9.884) (10.26) (9.796) (9.837) (8.583) (8.735) (8.864) (8.629) (8.712) (9.761) (9.419) (9.164) 
 Enforcement -5.032 29.7 54.08 -2.574 -4.892 14.17 46.13 63.84 15.47 14.67 29.26 4.28 31.83 
 
 
(171.3) (181.2) (178.4) (170.6) (172.7) (178.9) (188.4) (185.7) (177.7) (180.3) (193.1) (181.2) (188.4) 
 State environmental spending (%) -1.548 -1.758 -1.133 -1.815 -1.534 -0.385 -0.674 -0.239 -0.673 -0.337 -0.638 -1.447 -0.449 
 
 
(4.275) (4.459) (4.482) (4.258) (4.107) (4.112) (4.297) (4.220) (4.052) (3.931) (4.163) (4.624) (4.171) 
 State environmental employee (%) 5.521 5.533 6.338 5.352 5.519 5.085 5.129 5.91 4.956 5.077 5.401 5.158 4.728 
 
 
(7.725) (7.491) (7.687) (7.683) (7.777) (7.685) (7.472) (7.757) (7.650) (7.760) (7.544) (7.640) (7.789) 
 Capacity factor 139.9*** 134.4*** 140.8*** 138.3*** 140.0*** 141.5*** 136.2*** 142.0*** 140.0*** 141.8*** 137.2*** 136.4*** 131.6*** 
 
 
(36.56) (34.68) (38.88) (37.47) (37.65) (36.80) (35.11) (38.98) (37.78) (37.70) (34.12) (33.93) (31.92) 
 Operating revenue 2.131 2.246* 2.418 2.358 2.131 1.702 1.845 2.046 1.922 1.7 0.762 0.656 0.372 
 
 
(1.442) (1.295) (1.541) (1.476) (1.441) (1.438) (1.287) (1.578) (1.491) (1.435) (1.369) (1.423) (1.478) 
 Number of subsidiaries -15.30* -16.07** -16.18** -15.30* -15.31* -15.15** -15.90** -15.97** -15.15** -15.17* -15.40* -15.70* -16.07* 
 
 
(7.778) (7.585) (7.439) (7.675) (7.863) (7.535) (7.356) (7.206) (7.453) (7.613) (7.932) (7.839) (8.138) 
 Number of states 18.67*** 17.39*** 17.55*** 18.46*** 18.67*** 15.13*** 14.17*** 14.82*** 15.11*** 15.12*** 17.96*** 16.52*** 17.21*** 
 
 
(2.137) (1.761) (2.008) (2.214) (2.128) (1.331) (1.151) (1.182) (1.370) (1.312) (2.999) (2.584) (2.668) 
 Mergers & acquisitions 3.423 3.661 3.405 3.649 3.462 2.649 2.936 2.786 2.883 2.768 3.704 3.036 3.402 
 
 
(5.005) (5.238) (4.763) (5.079) (5.133) (5.040) (5.284) (4.876) (5.109) (5.205) (5.071) (5.602) (5.338) 
 Growth in output 23.51*** 64.04*** 63.16*** 36.22*** 22.96 23.85*** 62.81*** 59.64*** 35.04*** 22.14 23.18*** 24.08*** 24.46*** 
 
 
(6.916) (18.49) (15.20) (8.276) (16.15) (6.744) (17.52) (14.84) (7.926) (15.82) (6.032) (6.334) (6.331) 
 Change in CO2 emissions 5.188 4.637 6.094 4.867 5.186 5.505 4.952 6.262 5.208 5.5 5.231 5.663 5.371 
 
 
(5.330) (5.414) (5.289) (5.272) (5.326) (5.110) (5.178) (5.085) (5.046) (5.112) (5.212) (4.829) (5.200) 
 Net income -0.698 -1.634 -1.874 -1.038 -0.706 -11.02*** -11.15*** -10.05** -10.86*** -11.09*** -11.55** -10.88** -12.14*** 
 
 
(3.459) (3.489) (2.886) (3.266) (3.606) (3.736) (3.574) (3.801) (3.775) (3.994) (4.380) (4.414) (4.268) 
 Deregulation -13.35** -13.13** -14.41** -13.27* -13.34** -19.14** -18.49** -18.96** -18.81** -19.13** -26.86*** -28.69*** -26.65*** 
 
 
(6.486) (6.336) (6.022) (6.655) (6.619) (7.741) (7.480) (7.377) (7.968) (7.761) (9.223) (9.903) (8.825) 
 Growth × LCV -0.945***  
   
-0.909*** 
      
 
  
(0.338) 
    
(0.312) 
      
 Growth × Sierra -23.53*** 
 
 
  
-21.28*** 
 
 
   
 
   
(6.493) 
    
(6.685) 
     
 Growth × Enforcement 
 
-94.65*** 
    
-83.43*** 
    
 
    
(26.90) 
    
(29.76) 
    
 Growth × Deregulation 
  
0.896 
    
2.77 
   
 
   
 
 
(21.70) 
    
(21.71) 
   
 Net Income × Deregulation 
   
26.73** 24.72** 21.46 25.52** 26.83** 192.5** 188.1* 155.8* 
    
  (12.25) (11.46) (13.58) (12.46) (12.51) (90.10) (95.03) (79.85)  
Net Income × Deregulation × LCV 
   
     -2.403**    
      
     (1.187)    
Net Income × Deregulation × Sierra 
  
      -31.76*   
      
      (17.23)   
Net Income × Deregulation × Enforcement 
  
       -477.0*  
      
       (266.2)  
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Constant -62.23 -53.55 -54.33 -61.99 -62.22 -58.01 -49.99 -51.71 -57.99 -57.97 -65.94 -58.33 -56.42 
 
 
(49.13) (48.63) (46.39) (48.62) (49.24) (48.37) (47.90) (46.25) (48.03) (48.56) (47.61) (49.07) (50.38) 
 Observations 396 396 396 396 396 396 396 396 396 396 396 396 396 
 R-squared 0.174 0.182 0.182 0.176 0.174 0.178 0.185 0.184 0.18 0.178 0.188 0.188 0.185 
 Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4. Robustness Checks: Relative Growth and Relative Net Income 
 
Panel A: Relative Growth Variables instead of Absolute Growth1  Panel B: Relative Net Income Variables instead of Absolute Net Income1 
Growth relative to industry mean 25.34*** 
 
Net Income relative to industry mean -10.87*** 
 (8.430) 
 
 (3.826) 
Deregulation × Growth relative to industry mean -2.242 
 
Deregulation × Net Income relative to industry mean 26.37** 
(2.495) 
 
 (12.31) 
Growth relative to industry median 23.17  Net Income relative to industry median -10.95*** 
 (16.29)   (3.760) 
Deregulation × Growth relative to industry median 0.569  Deregulation × Net Income relative to industry median 26.61** 
(22.63)   (12.29) 
Growth relative to small/large firms mean2  3.535  Growth relative to small/large firms mean2  -7.00 
(4.638)   (5.097) 
Deregulation × Growth relative to small/large firms mean 2.178  Deregulation × Growth relative to small/large firms mean 19.32* 
(2.499)   (10.08) 
Growth relative to small/large firms median3 24.39  Growth relative to small/large firms median3 -8.116* 
(15.57)   (4.739) 
Deregulation × Growth relative to small/large firms median -0.71  Deregulation × Growth relative to small/large firms median 21.42** 
(21.81)   (10.30) 
Growth relative to quartile mean4  1.875*** 
 
Net Income relative to quartile mean2 -12.93*** 
 (0.407) 
 
 (2.813) 
Deregulation × Growth relative to quartile mean 0.592 
 
Deregulation × Net Income relative to quartile mean 22.18** 
(1.540) 
 
 (8.859) 
Growth relative to quartile median5 25.03 
 
Net Income relative quartile median3 -10.81*** 
 (16.96) 
 
 (3.970) 
Deregulation × Growth relative quartile median -1.391 
 
Deregulation × Net Income relative to quartile median 22.44** 
(22.33) 
 
 (10.61) 
Growth relative to revenue6 20.46 
 
Net Income relative to output4 -8.054 
 (15.47) 
 
 (5.122) 
Deregulation × Growth relative to revenue 5.005 
 
Deregulation × Net Income relative to output 21.36* 
(21.02) 
 
 (11.82) 
Growth relative to revenue and revenue square7 25.18* 
 
Net Income relative to output and output square5 -8.32 
(13.40) 
 
 (5.000) 
Deregulation × Growth relative to revenue and revenue square -3.051 
 
Deregulation × Net Income relative to output and output square 21.92* 
(16.39) 
 
 (11.92) 
   Net Income relative to revenue6 -10.59*** 
    (3.333) 
   Deregulation × Net Income relative to revenue 23.41** 
    (11.39) 
   Net Income relative to revenue and revenue square7 -10.62*** 
    (3.326) 
   Deregulation × Net Income relative to revenue and revenue square 23.46** 
    (11.44) 
1 This table shows results replacing the growth variable and the interaction variable between 
growth and deregulation in model (5) of Table 3 with relative growth measures (refer to p.24 
for more details).  
2 The industry mean is calculated separately for small and large firms based on firm revenue. 
3 The industry median is calculated separately for small and large firms based on firm 
revenue.  
  4 The mean is calculated separately for four quartiles based on firm revenue. 
   5 The median is calculated separately for four quartiles based on firm revenue.  
   6 The residual obtained by OLS regression of growth on firm revenue.  
 7 The residual obtained by OLS regression of growth on firm revenue and the square of firm 
revenue. 
1 This table shows results replacing the income variable and the interaction variable between income and 
deregulation in model (6) of Table 3 with relative income measures (refer to p.24 for more details). 2 The 
industry mean is calculated separately for small and large firms based on firm revenue.  
3 The industry median is calculated separately for small and large firms based on firm revenue.  
4 The mean is calculated separately for four quartiles based on firm revenue. 
5 The median is calculated separately for four quartiles based on firm revenue. 
6 The residual obtained by OLS regression of income on firm output. 
7 The residual obtained by OLS regression of income on firm output and the square of firm output. 8 The 
residual obtained by OLS regression of income on firm revenue. 
9 The residual obtained by OLS regression of income on firm revenue and the square of firm revenue. 
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Figure 1. Deviation between reported and actual emissions reductions  
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